

6 'We Never Plan for the Worst Case': Considering the Case of Germany*

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Introduction

Events related to the Arab uprisings, ISIS's rise to power and Russia's aggression against parts of Ukraine in 2014 posed complex, though distinct challenges for the Federal Republic of Germany. How well were German leaders and officials informed about nascent as well as short-term developments beforehand and once these crises erupted? The widely shared appearance of sharp discontinuity in the way related historical processes unfolded raises questions about the degree to which decision makers and officials in government were taken by surprise. Just like a realistic question cannot be framed based on a surprise/no-surprise dichotomy, it

* This article was finished in April 2021. In the meantime, Putin's aggression against Ukraine has turned the world upside down. More than many other states, Germany gave the impression of being surprised and overtaken by events. Germany's all but complete underestimation of the aggressive potential of Putin's Russia, its atrophic strategic approach, and failed diplomacy stirred up an international debate on German security and foreign policies which is still ongoing. It appears that the wide-spread miscalculation of Russian behaviour was partly a result of wishful, if not naïve, thinking, neglect of history, and sheer absence of a strategic debate deserving that name. The transformative events of 2022 underline the urgent necessity for adaptations with regard to military strategy, diplomacy and intelligence as is argued below. The issue of a National Security Council was discussed in the 2021 Bundestag election campaign but not taken up by the new coalition government.

will not be possible, also under ideal circumstances with access to pertinent government files and documents, to justify a flat answer to the question of the degree of surprise (see Chapter 1).

Thus, when considering the case of Germany, we are wise to appreciate humility as an analytic virtue and when we try to understand how little we can ascertain about relevant processes based on documentation which is hitherto available in the public domain. Moreover, we must be cognizant of the fact that we would need to study the knowledge and beliefs of leaders and officials when seeking to examine how well informed or surprised government officials were in each of the three cases. This will remain difficult even when the archival record permits deeper insight into government thinking at the time. We do not wish to obscure the point that the question of how much German leaders and officials were surprised cannot now or in the next two or three decades be examined with a reasonable level of confidence based on publicly available sources. This also holds true for scholarship which seeks to reconstruct analytical judgements of intelligence analysts as well as leadership receptivity to secret intelligence products. By definition, those products are secret and mean to inform the perspectives of a selected, and at times very small, number of political and military leaders and civil servants.

It is obvious that questions related to 'good governance' raise formidable difficulties when they ask about lessons learned, not learned, or yet to be learned by the German government considering the cases under study here. Approximation to the analysis of those questions is not excluded, though. Attempting to learn based on an imperfect data set is also much better than not trying to learn at all. This is what our chapter seeks to contribute.

The first section of our chapter raises issues which should inform potential post-mortem analyses of non-linearity or crisis anticipation performance of the German government. The second section focuses on central aspects of that performance with an eye to the Ukraine crisis of 2013–14. Section three discusses the discrepancies between audibility of calls for strategic far-sightedness in German foreign and security policy and discernible change in the practice of that policy during the twenty-first century. The fourth section lays out key aspects of how structures of Germany's assessment system were adapted in the years following the Arab uprisings, ISIS's rise

to power and Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2014. As such, this chapter pays specific attention to the locus of estimative strategic intelligence within assessment capacities. Finally, the chapter offers a brief conclusion by pointing to overdue changes in Germany's approach to security policy that revolves around the need to become more strategic and serious about the possibility of surprise, including surprise related to existential threats.

Specific Considerations and Guiding Questions in Search of Lessons

Considering the outbreak of the Arab uprisings, ISIS's rise to power and Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2014, analysts and scholars may retrospectively examine either in government or based on then-declassified government records whether and which specific efforts were made by the German government in the 2010s to identify, assess and potentially learn from positive and deficient aspects in anticipatory assessment regarding those cases and, potentially, additional ones. Specific considerations and guiding questions building on the theoretical framework in Chapter 1 of this volume should inform any such endeavour, with prejudicing what the available evidence may indicate in the future. An overarching point is that lesson learning needs to be attempted with both humility and precision.

To begin with, to the extent efforts were made within the German government to think about 'lessons', an important aspect to notice is that recording 'lessons' is profoundly different 'from actually learning from experience'.¹ Identifying what went wrong or what seemed to have worked rather well in those three cases will not be free from hindsight knowledge (which is not necessarily hindsight bias) despite recognition of analytical problems which this perspective poses. Also, it will be not per se be a recipe for better anticipation or avoiding surprise in the future, no matter how rigorous the analysis is done and no matter whether it will be formally mandated, say, by cabinet, a minister, or the head of an agency. In fact, even before a government will be able to learn something from any such analysis, suppose production of the latter was indeed completed, non-trivial questions are bound to arise about how to

make use of such analytical results. Also, how important is publicness?² Who is supposed to receive unconstrained access to the results which the analysis presents? Will parliamentary committees, including oversight communities, receive copies? Should only some in government be allowed to read or be briefed about key judgments or just excerpts? And what would each of those and other variants imply? These sorts of questions are particularly relevant when secret intelligence becomes an object of retrospective investigation.³ In other words, retrospective analysis for the purpose of learning rather than recording may well be important. But even the management of a single and, ideally, objectively candid analysis can raise issues which can erect barriers to more systematic learning.

Moreover, to the extent that the German government made efforts to think about 'lessons', relevant actors in government who are tasked to identify lessons may have understood the meaning of learning lessons about anticipatory assessment differently than others. Even when confusion can be mitigated by precisely defining who should learn which lessons, this possibility remains considering different outlooks, analytic requirements, depths of insight, and responsibilities, say, of development aid officials, diplomats, military officers, strategic intelligence analysts and top-level decision-makers. One would also want to develop an understanding where and on which levels in government discussions about lessons took place and how much sustained attention of, or even interaction with, top-level leaders could be secured during the process. Considering the vast differences between the three cases addressed in this book – the Arab uprisings, ISIS's rise to power and Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2014 – and considering the complexities inherent in each of those cases, it seems reasonable to expect differences in the ways differently concerned actors shaped a potential intra-governmental discourse on 'lessons'. For example, even the meaning of the word 'crisis' may well remain ambiguous and, by extension, the meanings of composita like 'crisis early detection', 'crisis management', 'crisis prevention', 'crisis reaction', and so on. In short, analysts and scholars with an interest in carving out 'lessons' from the recent past will be well-advised to be very specific about the exact object of analysis and to consider that any attempt of thinking about general 'lessons' requires prior and rigorous

consideration of ‘lessons’ to be drawn from experiences in individual cases such as Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014.

In addition, and bearing in mind that the approach of this book is broad, one would have to be very precise when tailoring key questions to be investigated. This may mean limiting their scope, to begin with: should ‘lessons’ be learned about past government practices of anticipatory assessments? Or would this be too broadly defined? Should the search only and precisely concern the ways in which secret intelligence shaped anticipatory assessments? If so, is this about foreign and/or defence intelligence? Are we examining strategic estimates and/or estimates included in current intelligence? Or, to name yet another alternative, should ‘lessons’ be learned only about how Germany’s warning system functioned in each of those and, potentially, in other cases?

Suppose secret intelligence input to the broader process of anticipatory assessment in government was to be made the subject of inquiry. Even then there will be different categories of specific questions which may be of concern. For example, even if questions concerning the quantity and quality of intelligence collection were to be left aside, important as they are, one would want to consider the quality of the analytic process which culminated in estimates of where developments in the Maghreb region and greater Middle East, Syria and Iraq, and Ukraine were headed, what the nature of changes was, how fast changes unfolded, and so on. One would also want to be very careful about judgements which touch on the issue of competence of individuals who made estimates.

One would also want to be fair enough to acknowledge that no universally accepted method exists allowing estimators to anticipate when non-linearities occur, while, on the other hand, most conflicts have a degree of shape or structure that allows prior exploration or even explanation of conditions which can with a certain (to be specified) likelihood give rise to non-linearities.⁴ Especially, the concept of ‘prediction’ in the sense of forecasting as a form of historical prognosis is often referred to in a careless way to insinuate that intelligence analysts, in particular, can or should be expected to deliver ‘predictions’.⁵ In fact, they cannot – at least unless forecasting methods are applied. But even when such demanding methods are applied, inherent limitations of intel-

Intelligence cannot be overcome. Intelligence can 'help reduce uncertainty'⁶ or, conversely, appreciate uncertainty, that is, 'disturb prevailing policy and decrease rather than increase' the certainty of judgement.⁷ Often, intelligence accomplishes both at the same time.

In line with this understanding, an interesting expectation arises regarding the case of the Ukraine crisis, for example. Even in the absence of strategic consensus in Germany on how to analyse and estimate Russia's national security decision-making, long before the Euromaidan protests and at least since the Georgia War in 2008, the scope of Russia's categorical aversion to a Western-bound Ukraine may have been rather well understood at least by observers working in all-source environments while decision-makers may have resisted the notion that the case of Ukraine amounted to a zero-sum geo-strategic conflict also involving the US as an extra-regional great power. In other words, expecting largely warranted 'a priori strategic assumptions' may well be realistic at least with regards to analysts in all-source environments committed to understanding the world how it is and not how it should be. Moreover, it would also appear realistic to expect that, as the crisis unfolded, various 'tactical' indications of Russian military actions could not remain hidden to defence intelligence structures in various countries.⁸

Because expecting 'predictions' from intelligence analysts, or anticipatory analysis more generally, about complex political, social and military phenomena in other countries would mean expecting too much, retrospective analysis of estimative performance should be cautious or even avoid attempts to measure how well estimators 'predicted' what happened. The more interesting issue would be to try to understand the shape of mindsets which framed the thinking of analysts and provided a basis for their best estimates as well as the contours of the information basis that was available to them at the time.⁹

What's more, one would have to avoid the fundamental errors of conflating 'incorrect answers with deficient if not incompetent ways of thinking', on the one hand, and of 'equat[ing] reasonable, well-grounded inferences with those that proved to be correct', on the other.¹⁰ All of the mentioned points, of course, relate to a central difficulty involved in any effort to retrospectively focus

on the secret intelligence input to the broader process of anticipatory assessment in government: 'In judging the performance of any intelligence organization we need first to come to a realistic understanding of the limits to intelligence.'¹¹

Perhaps even more difficult to assess would be the additional question of what difference it would have made if decision-makers (in this case: German decision-makers) were – hypothetically – less surprised or, hence, better informed. Would this have enabled them to make decisions which would have made a difference before the potential occurrence of non-linear events such as the Arab uprisings, ISIS's rise to power and Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2014? An intuitive answer may be some form of yes, but this may be misleading. Besides the issue of leadership receptivity to anticipatory assessments, including secret intelligence assessments, and the issue of availability of levers to influence other states' behaviours within the constraints of the international environment, one may actually expect insensitivity of leaders to most early detection, early warning or even crisis anticipation information as long as national interests are judged not to be at stake if and when estimated changes materialise.¹² In fact, top-level decision-makers may even not always value better anticipatory assessments regarding issues which do affect national interests and they may hence prefer to count on their own abilities to contribute to crisis management if a crisis materialises – despite the problem that crises can be hectic, stressful, unusual and complex 'episodes of threat, uncertainty, and urgency'.¹³ Moreover, decision-makers may not unequivocally value better anticipatory assessments even in more important cases, because the more accurate assessments are, the more they can increase potentially unwelcome political pressures to act with measures which may be costly, unpopular, difficult to legitimise or contested in terms of their adequacy and effectiveness to prevent, mitigate or manage problems.¹⁴ Anticipatory assessments may hence tend to constrain freedom of manoeuvre before and also when a non-linearity occurs. This can make assessments unwelcome, especially when they illuminate how little a government may be able or resolved to shape the course of certain foreign events at distant places by measures of preventive or reactive crisis management.¹⁵

The Ukraine Crisis and Germany's Anticipation Performance

'We EU representatives are always a little naïve, and believe that our mission will turn out all right because we are fighting for the right values. We never plan for the worst case.' These are the words that a senior official with the European Commission was quoted as saying in *Der Spiegel* in 2014, looking back on Ukraine.¹⁶ Although the quote goes back to a high EU diplomat, it might have come from a senior civil servant from the German government who bluntly addresses strategic planning deficits in the German system. Against this background, the experience of the Ukraine crisis is intrinsically linked to the still ongoing debate on how to reorganise German security policy. With the decision not to sign the EU Association Agreement in November 2013, the events of the spring of 2014 that would lead to the Russian annexation of Crimea and the crisis in eastern Ukraine took their course. Most of this came as a strategic surprise to German diplomacy. This was not because Ukraine was neglected as a topic. It was rather due to a natural focus on Russia which can be explained, inter alia, by a durable framing of 'Ostpolitik' and the remembrance of the Soviet Union's approval for Germany's reunification. The resulting under-appreciation of the Ukraine question in German diplomacy was comparable to tendencies within the European Union where that question was not given the appropriate strategic weight. The NATO Ukraine Commission played only a subordinate role in the overall diplomatic structure of the Alliance. The lack of attention paid to Ukraine by politicians and the media in Germany became a problem precisely at the moment when the geo-economic penetration of Europe by German companies was taking shape – for example through the transport of Russian gas directly to Germany on the seabed via the Baltic Sea pipeline Nord Stream I, the longest underwater pipeline in the world, one of Europe's biggest infrastructure projects.

Attention to geostrategic drivers for Russian foreign economic policy in Eastern Europe was generally absent from political and strategic discussions at top levels in Berlin. At the same time, from the very outset the Nord Stream project was designed by Russia to

undermine the position of Ukraine as a dominant transit state for the transport of Russian gas to Europe, and the Russian parallel project South Stream – a second underwater pipe on the bed of the Black Sea – prompted yet another shift of power in Eastern Europe which increased risks to the architecture of trans-European security.¹⁷

Aside from the underestimation of the strategic significance of Ukraine, serious errors in European diplomacy contributed to significant hesitations along the journey to the as-yet unsigned EU Association Agreement. Legal experts and translators took almost a year to write the finished version of the agreement text. Political and diplomatic misjudgements of the active players were all the more serious as a result. In particular, EU negotiation leader Stefan Füle did not pay sufficient attention to the personality of the then Ukrainian Prime Minister Yanukovich and his relationship with Russia, just as the geopolitical arguments and motivation of the Russian administration under the leadership of President Putin were underestimated. Even when Füle's visit to Kyiv on 21 November 2013 was cancelled at short notice by the Ukrainians, this did not lead to deeper reflection in Brussels and Berlin about a possibly changing strategic situation.

In Berlin, all political attention was at this point focused on the negotiations to establish a new coalition government. The acceptance speech of the new Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier in the *Auswärtiges Amt* on 17 December 2013 can be seen as a cautious step back, and as preparation for a fundamental change of course in German foreign policy towards Ukraine.¹⁸ Steinmeier had already held this post from 2005 until 2009 under Chancellor Angela Merkel. He was generally seen as one of the most insightful advocates of a Russo-German rapprochement. However, in his acceptance speech, he expressed clear criticism of Russia's instrumentalisation of the economic situation of Ukraine and the non-signature of the EU Association Agreement. Still, it was not clear enough to Western services and diplomatic missions at this point to what extent the diplomatic crisis would further intensify over the coming weeks.

When, at the 50th Munich Security Conference on 31 January 2014, Federal President Joachim Gauck delivered an eloquent

statement with coalition-wide support on Germany's willingness to assume greater responsibility in the world, it was by no means clear that Ukraine would become the next test case in that regard.¹⁹

In mid-February 2014, there were further dramatic developments in events in Ukraine. In a parliamentary session that was broadcast on television, Victor Yanukovich was stripped of his office, and parliament elected the former vice head of government Aleksandr Turchynov as President with a large majority. In the early hours of 19 February 2014, thousands of people had demonstrated in the Maidan square for early presidential elections and a new constitution as well as Yanukovich's compact with the parliamentary opposition. There were protests all over the country. The United States demanded an immediate withdrawal of security forces from the Maidan. EU Commission President Barroso, on the other hand, was only prompted under the pressure of events to announce targeted measures by the European Union. The Russian occupation of Crimea occurred gradually through camouflaged individual movements. Added to this was the fact that some 60,000 members of the Ukrainian combat forces had gone over to the new pro-Russian government. This 'strategic surprise' was only gradually revealed in the various telephone calls that Federal Chancellor Merkel had with President Putin. Because of these events, personnel resources were pooled both in the German Embassy in Kyiv and in the headquarters of the Foreign Office and the Defence Ministry in Berlin, so that the accelerating developments could be grasped as promptly as possible by intense monitoring.

At the NATO Defence Ministry Council meeting on 26 February 2014 there were disputes within the Alliance about whether Ukraine should even be an issue on the agenda. This judgement was also connected with the impetus of the strategic surprise and the inadequate diplomatic analysis that underlay it. In the end, as a result of the speed of developments, Ukraine was discussed with German involvement.

In late February 2014, the critical situation came to a peak. In several places on the Black Sea peninsula of Crimea, at two airports, outside the regional parliament in Simferopol and near the port city of Sevastopol, there were sightings of men in the uniforms of the pro-Russian combat unit Berkut, who were undertaking

targeted action on behalf of the Russians. At this point they had already taken power with the help of outside influence, when the Ukrainian government was announcing that its own security forces still had complete control on the Crimean Peninsula. The ISES paper on the further response to Ukraine argued for the early involvement of the new Ukrainian government and a revival of the NATO-Ukraine Commission with the aim of supporting democratic reforms, the democratic control of the security sector, defence reforms and practical military cooperation.

The various efforts by diplomats – including a joint trip by the High Commissioner for National Minorities of the OSZE, Astrid Thors, and the Swiss OSZE special envoy to Kyiv, Tim Guldemann, as well as discussions held by Federal Minister Steinmeier with the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Geneva – helped to establish an overview of the situation. And their purpose was to help the European states reach a unified position on the Crimean question.

At the European Council meeting of 6 March 2014, an agreement on sanctions was reached.²⁰ The agreement in the political judgement altered nothing about the fact that in the crucial phase between October 2013 and February 2014 most mechanisms of a far-sighted strategic analysis had failed. In some European capitals, including Berlin, internal developments in Ukraine had been misunderstood in terms of their effects on the political calculations of the Kremlin and Putin's geopolitical ambitions. Had national security planning been strategically oriented, and the diplomatic initiatives of the German Foreign Office been tempered in terms of security policy, some of the misjudgements could have been avoided, and the political and strategic deficits that were clearly present in Brussels could have been mitigated.

Against this background, it may come as a surprise that in the assessment of the foreign policy of the Merkel era the 2014 Ukraine crisis is commonly seen as a phase of great visibility and diplomatic activity. Above all, this has to do with the role that the Chancellor played in international crisis management during the crucial phase of the conflict, with her important telephone calls to President Putin and the American President Obama. This has been sufficiently appreciated in retrospective academic treatments of the

period, and it has been perceived as a particularly active moment for and as a highlight of German diplomacy.²¹ An awareness of deficits in the structures of German foreign and security policy continued to increase in the Federal Government, the Bundestag, and the public in 2013–14. This realisation was spurred not least by scholarly contributions made in the wake of the discussion about Germany's international role at the Munich Security Conference, which was held at the time when the Ukraine crisis was unfolding. The Ukraine crisis of 2013–14, more so than the Comprehensive Approach discussion in the Afghanistan War (especially since 2006), the Libya crisis and the dramatic Syrian civil war, drew attention to the fact that a comprehensive overview of the security policy situation is necessary for successful government action. It was, above all, the diplomatic leadership of Chancellor Angela Merkel that led to a link between the events of the Ukraine crisis, Germany's international responsibility and the paradigm shift in contemporary history.

Strategic Far-Sightedness: Discrepancies between Audibility and Practice

The perhaps over-hasty identification by Heinrich August Winkler of the Ukraine crisis as a 'parting of the ways in the international system'²² is indicative of the emphasis given to the Ukraine crisis. From the contemporary perspective within the German government, the crisis was placed in a line that began with Putin's speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, that became visible in the Russian opposition against the attempts in 2008 to bring Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, and that became more salient in the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 which resulted in Russia's official recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states.

In retrospect, during this phase, calls for strategic far-sightedness in German foreign and security policy became distinctly more audible. The Foreign Office and the Federal Defence Ministry in particular, in terms of the responsibilities within their respective departments, set in motion internal measures for the creation of crisis structures.

Overall, the demand for new structures to deliver strategic planning, analysis and coordination is one of the major recurring themes in German foreign and security policy.²³ The experiences of the Ukraine crisis may have reinforced this. It has led above all to the recognition of the political necessity of a consistent overall strategic approach. This again, however, is not a new recognition. It was given fresh impetus in the context of the Ukraine crisis, although no crucial breakthrough has occurred since then. It is remarkable that despite a more clearly articulated demand for crisis-proof structures and far-sighted security policy, no progress has been made in the discussion about a strengthening of the Federal Security Council, including a joint Situation Centre for the Federal Government. Consequently, Germany is lagging far behind almost all of its partners in the coordination of foreign and security policy. In this regard it compares very badly, particularly in comparison with the US, France and the UK.

Disdain for strategic policy documents, and the unwillingness to engage with the strategic principles of such countries as France or the UK in terms of their consequences for political action in Germany, is also reflected in the absence of debates on the subject in the German Bundestag. Pertinent parliamentary debate was not planned, let alone a vote on the subject. Involvement of individual parliamentarians in the production of documents did not take place, as is customary in France, for example, within the context of the French White Paper process. Added to this is the fact that in Germany – unlike the US, the UK or France which are nuclear powers with global interests – a strategic culture remains relatively undeveloped in which also security policy documents are an essential element in the definition and communication of national security objectives. This ‘strategic special case’ may on the one hand be a feature of foreign policy debate in Germany. However, it also causes problems when it comes to thinking about reference points associated with the publication of documents on security policy. Changes in strategic culture cannot be achieved without the involvement of the German Parliament. Joint sessions between the Defence Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee, an annual debate about the Chancellor’s State of the Nation message, and strategically deployed joint conferences, for example between

the Bundestag and the Assemblée Nationale, could provide important impulses here.

In terms of inter-ministerial thinking and coordination, too, Germany is failing to keep pace with developments in countries such as Canada, Switzerland or Norway, if we compare it for example with the state of Afghanistan coordination in Canada after 2006 or inter-ministerial processes within the Swiss Federation. These obvious deficits cannot be explained only in terms of the inherent constraints of coalition governments, in which the leadership positions in specialist departments devoted to foreign affairs, defence or development are assigned to different parties. That structure surely incentivises those leaders to preserve their departmental competencies and to insist on joint leadership. But, in addition, these constraints can be explained against the background of party politics in Germany which have led to a tendency of giving more and more political weight to coalition committees composed of key players from ministries, parliamentary groups and party presidents. Other reasons stem from more deep-rooted factors in the political culture, the relative unimportance of foreign and security policy issues to the career paths of the deputies representing the different party groups in the Bundestag, insufficient pressure from the expert public, and not least a lack of insight into the demands of inter-departmental actions between senior officials from the various ministries.

The decision made in the Bundestag on 28 April 2014 by the executive committees of the CDU/CSU and SPD groups devoted to crisis and conflict resolution only exposed in general terms Germany's responsibility for a just world order and reaffirmed its commitment to 'mastering global challenges [...] in a coordinated deployment of all instruments of foreign, security, defence and development policy'.²⁴ The small degree to which the experiences of the Ukraine crisis were used to effect operational changes became visible also in the results of the review process undertaken by Minister Steinmeier in 2014.²⁵ The review process was supposed to open up a fundamental survey of German foreign policy and a broad public debate. But it led to no considerable organisational consequences for the conduct of German foreign and security policy such as, to provide an example, a strategic guidance

to recalibrate the role of Germany's foreign missions. A concrete example is the establishment of a department for crisis prevention, stabilisation, conflict resolution and humanitarian aid in the German Foreign Office that is intended to somehow bundle instruments, funds and competencies of German foreign policy in the field.

The 2016 White Paper process launched by Defence Minister von der Leyen²⁶ at around the same time – which was first intended as a process to involve the participatory contribution of the German public in the discussion of fundamental questions of German foreign and security policy beyond the tighter circles of the specialist public to a previously unknown degree – did not mention any strategic surprises sparked by the Ukraine crisis. Consequently, the two processes did not lead to any structural changes in the sphere of foreign and security policy and had no lasting impact on the narrower debate. In particular, Minister Steinmeier's review process in the Foreign Office squandered the opportunity to pave the way for an inter-ministerial understanding of threats and risk to security as well as attempts to cope with them. The regularly recurring problems that arise in the context of discussions on White Papers, to formulate a cross-coalition consensus on security policy, once again emphasise the necessity that a broadening of cross-party convictions concerning security policy and the willingness to draw operational conclusions from them, are among the most urgent desiderata of German security policy, which suffers from a deficit between the conceptual demand of 'networked security'²⁷ and its practical application.

A detailed consideration of inter-ministerial structures regarding security policy and the coordinating function of the Federal Chancellery reveals the existing deficits which have become much more visible as the result of contemporary geopolitical developments. With the Federal Security Council (under its new rules of procedure of 13 August 2015),²⁸ there is already a government cabinet committee that has an advisory function particularly in the field of defence policy. It contributes to the preparation of relevant political decisions of the Federal Chancellor or the Federal Government. It is also backed by an inter-ministerial secretariat with liaison officials and liaison

officers under the direction of a managerial official. The Federal Security Council was established in October 1955 by the Second Adenauer cabinet under the name Federal Defence Committee. The presidency was held between 1964 and 1966 by Heinrich Krone as Minister for the Federal Defence Council, who between 1961 and 1964 had already coordinated the Council's agenda as Minister for Special Affairs. Beyond questions of arms export policy, the Federal Security Council now has no coordinating or strategically guiding function.²⁹ However, an overall strategic approach would require an effective joint situation centre, joint instruments for planning and analysis, inter-departmental project teams and a constant exchange on all levels. This would be consistent with a networked approach, the growing significance of a coordinated process between states, particularly with Germany's strategic partners, the development of a joint security policy within the European Union, integrated structures within NATO and the transatlantic security partnership with the US in an age of rapidly accelerating globalisation, re-emergence of great power competition and an increasing US geostrategic focus on the Western Pacific region.

An understanding of the importance of crisis prevention has been growing within the Federal Government since 2014. The German Foreign Office's Crisis Reaction Centre helps to ensure that there can be swift reactions to crises around the clock. A crisis prevention database collects information for global crisis developments. The Foreign Office runs the Federal Government's Crisis Staff regarding all foreign situations and maintains close connections with them. But there have been no further institutional steps towards reform. Despite numerous announcements concerning the establishment of a National Security Council, there have not been even any minor attempts to develop the organisation of the Federal Security Council. In response to a critical written request by Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, Grigorios Aggelidis, Renata Alt, other deputies and the FDP parliamentary group relating to concrete results of the attempts by Minister Kramp-Karrenbauer to establish a National Security Council pursuant to a speech she gave on 7 November 2019 at the University of the German Federal Armed Forces, the Federal Government stated in a letter

from the Federal Defence Ministry from 13 January 2020: the Federal Defence Ministry had

taken a long-term view and prospectively outlined that a future Federal government could strive for a further development of the Federal Security Council with the goal of planning, deciding and acting even more far-sightedly, quickly and precisely in policy areas such as diplomacy, the military, economy and action, internal security and development cooperation.³⁰

At the same time, knowledgeable observers from abroad, such as Julianne Smith, now the Ambassador of the US to NATO, recommended – in a clear analysis of the internal political situations and the pronounced egoism of departments within Germany – that they should follow the examples of Japan (2013) and the United Kingdom (2010) and develop a new approach towards the structure of security policy.³¹ The internal political debate around the Federal Security Council is characterised by spurious constitutional arguments and alarmist scenarios whereby the introduction of a National Security Council might involve a change in the political system. The debate in the Bundestag about the proposal by CDU deputy Schockenhoff from 2008, for example, revealed a phalanx of rejections ranging from the FDP via the SPD, Alliance 90/The Greens all the way to Die Linke, based on a familiar canon of well-trodden arguments on the subject.³²

In the literature, concerns about democracy are repeatedly voiced in connection with the establishment of a National Security Council. Critics argue that the upgrading of the Federal Security Council to a National Security Council '[would] shift the existing distribution of competences between the Federal Government and the Länder in favour of the Federal Government', and 'given the lack of Parliamentary checks, would lead to a perpetuation of the democratic deficit that we have already noted'.³³

This is an unwarranted overstatement. The creation of a National Security Council would be in accordance with constitutional guidelines, with existing principles of democratic legitimisation and federalism, and with the administrative orders of the Office of the Federal Chancellor. Just as in France and the UK, such a structure would also be in line with intelligence oversight

practices of the Federal Chancellor's office, parliament, courts and other federal German entities. When it comes to secret intelligence, Germany's briefing culture is not comparable to the US, for example, where the head of government also systematically receives information inputs directly from the intelligence community, including current intelligence tailored to their needs as well as strategic intelligence products. In Germany, the chiefs of federal intelligence services meet once a week with State Secretaries from pertinent ministries in a session which is chaired by the head of the Federal Chancellor's office.³⁴ The Foreign Minister can derive his – still relatively strong – position within the foreign and security planning and decision-making process from his departmental responsibility alone. The Foreign Minister only assumes a coordinating role, and an extremely limited one, in the context of the usual departmental coordination within the Federal Government. In the field of politics at the European level over the last few years he has had to surrender several responsibilities to other departments. This also explains why the Foreign Office has clung so stubbornly to the departmental responsibility for security policy assigned to it. It is only in the preparation of Bundestag mandates in connection with deployments of the German armed forces abroad that there is shared responsibility between the Foreign Office and the Federal Defence Ministry. Cross-departmental task forces could be a reasonable solution to the problem. But they were only practised – successfully – in the context of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s when officials from the Foreign Office and members of the Federal Defence Ministry worked together in a special Bosnia task force. Considering increasing strategic uncertainties regarding the next decades, organisational changes aiming at a whole of government approach and enabling strategic debates are even more urgent.

It would be especially important to connect assessment capacities for situational awareness, explanation and estimation on the comprehensive basis of reports from the embassies, the federal intelligence services, the armed forces, and the disarmament and arms control organisations. Establishing a centralised situation centre as a secretariat under the auspices of the Federal Security Council (perhaps based on the British model, with at least 200

posts) would have to go hand in hand with establishing a leadership centre with the task of providing a daily establishment of the situation, political assessment and proposals for action. Such a Security Council, to be led by a secretary of state or a distinct Federal Minister of Security, would support decision-making of the Cabinet as a whole. Political safeguards – creating a corresponding committee of the German Bundestag – should follow. A national political and military planning and leadership component would also require long-term education and training of the leadership staff.³⁵

Adaptation of security policy decision-making structures neither calls for a change to the constitution nor requires any kind of incisive legislation. Above all, the departmental principle is not in conflict with stronger coordination in strategic analysis and planning under the auspices of the Federal Chancellor's office. On the contrary, as long as security policy, threat and risk analysis, strategic planning and the deployment of resources affect core areas of different departments, an intensive coordination should be expected to be a necessary consequence of departmental thinking as understood in functional terms. In the field of the 'security constitution', some military deployments require a decision by the whole cabinet.³⁶ The German constitution aims, with competence guidelines and a system of checks and balances, to achieve 'functional appropriateness'.³⁷

Germany's Anticipatory Assessment Capacities and the Stature of Intelligence

To the extent that it is publicly discernable, the evolution of Germany's anticipatory assessment capacities may at first glance appear to be caused by or correlated with potential intra-governmental efforts to explicitly learn lessons from the recent past, including lessons concerning the performance of anticipatory assessments related to the Arab uprisings, ISIS's rise to power and Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2014. As the previous section highlighted, it is important to note that incisive change in the architecture of Germany's national security system remained

absent despite the cumulative turbulences due to surprises related to the Arab uprisings, ISIS and Ukraine.

Just like Germany does not yet have a kind of National Security Council, there is no entity in Germany comparable to organisations such as the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) or the National Intelligence Council (NIC) in the US or the Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO) and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in the UK. As argued above, a comparable kind of organisation in Germany might serve as situation and assessment centre for a reformed Bundessicherheitsrat. If established, it should not be constrained to current intelligence but should also represent the locus for most authoritative, all-source fusion, interdisciplinary (political, military, etc.), integrated and hence inter-departmentally coordinated strategic intelligence production, to inform and 'speak truth to power'³⁸ to the highest levels of government concerning foreign and security policy matters which are most pressing from a strategic perspective geared towards national interests. Recommendations focusing on intelligence assessment have been made by intelligence experts at least since the mid-1990s based on arguments on how to better prepare Germany for an era of increased international complexity, power diffusion, fragile and failed states close to the EU, transnational threats like terrorism, and renewed relevance of inter-state conflict, including great power competition and its fundamental implications for the future of the European and transatlantic security order.³⁹

In comparison to such a potential quantum leap forward, the pattern of discernable change in Germany's anticipatory assessment capacities since the 2010s reveals the evolution of an ancillary inter-ministerial approach to increase the coherence of horizon scanning and crisis early detection assessment capacities in Germany (*Krisenfrüherkennung/KFE*). The Foreign Office, the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Ministry of Defence established units to conduct KFE assessments to monitor political, economic, societal and military potentials for crises developments in other countries and regions of interest. Directed by the Foreign Office, an inter-departmental 'Horizon Scanning working group' (*Arbeitsgruppe KFE*) consisting of analysts from these ministries as well as from the Ministry of

the Interior, the Chancellery and Germany's foreign intelligence service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) is regularly convened to jointly evaluate potentials of crises. This group also prepares a specific analytic product (*KFE-Kurzanalyse*). Results of the group's work are regularly reported to a body consisting of heads of departments at least from involved ministries.⁴⁰ Products are hence received well below the level of decision-makers and thus tend to be far away from their immediate focus of attention.

These activities to adapt Germany's anticipatory assessment capacities were embedded in an increasingly active specialist discourse on methods and potential practices of strategic foresight. This discourse was often elusive and usually connected to broader debates about Germany foreign and security policy and the over-hyped assertion of 'Germany's new responsibility'. At times, calls for better crisis early detection capacities were prematurely associated with the outcome of an improved capacity to think and act strategically.⁴¹ This evades the problem of how to organise anticipatory assessment capacities in government to which top policymakers pay attention. A feature in this discourse appears to be an underdeveloped, if existing at all, understanding and appreciation of the specific benefits that secret intelligence may bring to the table. Several contributions tend to convey the impression that the meaning of crisis early detection is more or less synonymous with secret intelligence support to policymaking or that the former necessarily involves the latter.⁴² Hence, the mentioned increase in horizon scanning and crisis early detection activities tends to suggest greater reliance on secret intelligence input to German decision-making.

But considering the configuration of the inter-agency approach to horizon scanning and crisis early detection, this development cannot be equated with a more prominent stature of secret intelligence support to German foreign and security policy decision-making which, from a strategic perspective, would have to be at the centre of attention. The exact ways in which the BND contributes with its unique, all-source assessments to these activities under Foreign Office direction are not publicly known.⁴³ As a matter of principle, the BND retains a monopoly within the German system considering that it 'collects and evaluates the information required

to gain knowledge about foreign countries that are of importance to the Federal Republic of Germany in terms of foreign and security policy',⁴⁴

An additional difficulty is that concepts like early detection of non-linearities or crises (based on monitoring of indicators), on the one hand, and strategic intelligence estimates, on the other, appear to have been used interchangeably most of the time within the public discourse in Germany. In fact, they relate to methodologically specific analytic product categories.⁴⁵ Current intelligence relates to yet another category. Even a cursory glance at topics which intelligence analysts examined in bodies like the NIC in the US or the JIC in Britain reveals that strategic estimates rarely, if ever, offered indications and warning intelligence, but rigorous and all-source-based appraisals of the most fundamental, in fact often vital, life-and-death-type of issues which those nations faced, for example:⁴⁶

1. the evolution of military balances, particularly nuclear balances and vitally important regional military balances;
2. political-military strategies of great power and other competitors to succeed under peacetime, cold war, crisis, and limited war conditions, with particular emphasis on their willingness to threaten the use and to use force to achieve political objectives;
3. strategic intentions of competitors and enemies; and
4. the prospects and consequences of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Despite public audibility of calls for better strategic foresight, Germany's public discourse needs to rediscover the core of the strategic approach, namely, to take 'account of the part played by force or threat of force in the international system',⁴⁷ that is, the part of power and force to coerce, deter and compel. It appears to be imperative to prioritise the most consequential problem areas, namely first and foremost catastrophic risks due to outcomes of the evolution of inter-state relations such as, for example, diplomacy backed by threats, diplomacy backed by force and force backed by diplomacy⁴⁸ under changing technological but nuclear

conditions. The related choice would also demand working against the tendency, which may all too easily creep into horizon scanning activities, ‘to confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable’: ‘The contingency we have not considered seriously looks strange; what looks strange is thought improbable; what is improbable need not be considered seriously.’⁴⁹

Assuming a National Security Council were to be formed, including a pertinent situation and assessment centre, secret intelligence, particularly including strategic intelligence estimates, would be critical and the stature of intelligence would grow. That would be a novel development in Germany. Ideally, strategic intelligence support could, in turn, form the basis for additional layers of integrated strategic analysis which would have to receive the attention of top-level leaders.⁵⁰ Such a development would be unheard of in the Federal Republic of Germany – at least considering what the historical record shows thus far.

Conclusion

It is to be hoped that the profound experiences with international crises since the 2010s, with the COVID-19 pandemic and with catastrophes due to climate-dependent weather extremes will raise awareness in Germany for the necessities of better crisis preparedness, of a more efficient coordination of the instruments required for security policy, and, in the end, of a deeper understanding of security policy which is appropriate for its actual strategic significance and for dealing with structural changes in international relations. In Germany, the need for a more consistent strategic overall approach will grow in the years to come. This need will become a problem for German foreign and security policy to the extent that it will not be possible to achieve structural and mental adaptations to the changing reality. Or is a truly painful, or even existential, crisis necessary before Germany will want to learn this lesson? The most recent debate of August 2021 about misguided assessments, alleged intelligence failures, lack of cooperation and of political responsibility which resulted in a belated decision to evacuate the German embassy in Afghanistan also has to be seen exactly against

this background. Changes in the field of strategy and in relations between public administration and the public require structures for German foreign and security policy which will lead to a real change in awareness. This requirement refers to structural and organisational questions within the Federal Government, the relationship between the armed forces and political bodies, the stature of intelligence within the German national security system, and the sphere of parliament and foreign policy. It also refers particularly to the role that a long-term strategic orientation of politics involves towards present and future challenges. In addition, it requires an ability to define and impose one's own interests, to link the various fields together, and to create budgetary conditions under which more interrelated security instruments can be equipped with the funds they need to fulfil their new tasks. More than ever since the end of the Cold War era, one of the requirements of political action in a world shaped by increasing uncertainties is the willingness and ability to be prepared for strategic surprises, including potential surprises related to existential threats.

Notes

1. Lani Kass and J. Philipp London, 'Surprise, Deception, Denial and Warning', *Orbis* 57, no. 1 (2013): 71. See also Chapter 1.
2. On publicness and lesson learning, see: Stuart Farson and Mark Phythian, eds, *Commissions of Inquiry and National Security. Comparative Approaches* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010).
3. For an example of how the top-secret post-mortem report on US intelligence and the Iranian Revolution of 1979, a report written by an independent observer with a security clearance, Professor Robert Jervis, was received by CIA leaders, see: Robert Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), 116.
4. For this point, see: Charles F. Doran, 'Why Forecasts Fail: The Limits and Potential of Forecasting in International Relations and Economics', *International Studies Review* 1, no. 2 (1999).
5. On 'historical' as opposed to 'scientific predictions', see: Bertrand de Jouvenel, *L'Art de la conjecture* (Monaco: Editions du Rocher, 1964).

6. Bowman H. Miller, 'U.S. Strategic Intelligence Forecasting and the Perils of Prediction', *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 27, no. 4 (2014): 699; Thomasingar, *Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011).
7. Robert Jervis, 'Book Reviews', *Political Science Quarterly* 127, no. 1 (2012): 145. Intelligence 'often tells those in charge that their ideas may not be right and that several possibilities are plausible (. . .) When the world is uncertain, and the information available is even more so, intelligence must strive to reflect this.'
8. On the methodological hypothesis that these two aspects, namely the monitoring of 'tactical indicators' and the use of 'strategic assumptions' in estimates, represent core criteria for success or failure in understanding the potential for strategic surprise attacks, see: Abraham Ben-Zvi, 'Hindsight and Foresight: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Surprise Attacks', *World Politics* 27, no. 3 (1976).
9. On the importance of 'mindsets' in intelligence analysis see, inter alia: Richards J. Heuer and Randolph H. Pherson, *Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis* (Thousand Oaks, CA et al.: CQ Press, 2021), 183f.
10. Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails*, 124.
11. Percy Cradock, *Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World* (London: John Murray, 2002), 290.
12. Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails*, 179.
13. Stephen B. Dyson and Paul 't Hart, 'Crisis Management', in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, ed. Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears and Jack S. Levy (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 395–422, 395.
14. For the differentiation between better and more effective anticipation, see: Lars Brozus, *Fahren auf Sicht. Effektive Früherkennung in der politischen Praxis* (Berlin: SWP, 2018). For a critique of German passivity vis-à-vis the Syrian civil war despite apparently sufficient situational awareness, together with the counterfactual argument that even better anticipatory assessments would not have prompted a more resolved policy approach of chancellor Merkel: Sönke Neitzel and Bastian Matteo Scianna, *Blutige Enthaltung. Deutschlands Rolle im Syrienkrieg* (Freiburg: Herder, 2021), 113.
15. Paul R. Pillar, 'Predictive Intelligence: Policy Support or Spectator Sport', *SAIS Review* 27, no. 1 (2008).

16. Nikolaus Blome et al. 'Bis jenseits der Grenze', *Spiegel*, November 2014: 87.
17. See also: Nikki Ikani, 'Change and Continuity in the European Neighbourhood Policy: The Ukraine Crisis as a Critical Juncture', *Geopolitics* 24, no. 1 (2019); Nicholas Wright, 'No Longer the Elephant Outside the Room: Why the Ukraine Crisis Reflects a Deeper Shift Towards German Leadership of European Foreign Policy', *German Politics* 27, no. 4 (2018); Wolfgang Seibel, 'Arduous Learning on New Uncertainties? The Emergence of German Diplomacy in the Ukrainian Crisis', *Global Policy* 6, S1 (2015); Benjamin Teutmeyer, 'Die Rolle der NATO in der Ukraine-Krise', *Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik* 7 (2014); Mark Webber and James Sperling, 'NATO and the Ukrainian Crisis: Collective Securitisation', *European Journal of International Security* 2, no. 1 (2016); International Staff and Office of Secretary General, 'NATO Restricted Engaging the New Ukraine', 25 February 2014, Document PO (2014) 0101.
18. Federal Foreign Office, speech by Dr Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the handover ceremony on 17 December 2013.
19. Office of the Federal President, 'Germany's Role in the World: Reflections on Responsibility, Norms and Alliances', speech by Federal President Joachim Gauck at the opening of the Munich Security Conference on 31 January 2014.
20. European Council, 'Press Release 3028th Council Meeting General Affairs European Council. "Statement of the Heads of State or Government on Ukraine."' 6 March 2014. Brussels'.
21. See, for example: Kai Oppermann, 'Deutsche Außenpolitik während der dritten Amtszeit Angela Merkels', in *Zwischen Stillstand, Politikwandel und Krisenmanagement. Eine Bilanz der Regierung Merkel 2013–2017*, ed. Reimut Zohlnhöfer and Thomas Saalfeld (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2019).
22. Heinrich August Winkler, *Die Geschichte des Westens, Band 4: Die Zeit der Gegenwart* (München: C. H. Beck, 2016), 11.
23. Ulrich Schlie, 'Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik nach 1990: Auf der Suche nach einer Strategie', *Zeitschrift für Strategische Analysen* 4, no. 3 (2020); Ulrich Schlie, 'Warum Deutschland künftig mehr denn je auf einen gesamtstrategischen Ansatz in der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik angewiesen ist', in *Das Weißbuch 2016 und die Herausforderungen von Strategiebildung*, ed. Daniel Jacobi and Gunther Hellmann (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2019); Cord Meier-Klodt, *Einsatzbereit in*

- der Krise? Entscheidungsstrukturen der deutschen Sicherheitspolitik auf dem Prüfstand* (Berlin: SWP, 2002).
24. Beschluss der Geschäftsführenden Vorstände der CDU/CSU-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag und der SPD-Bundestagsfraktion, 'Deutsche Außenpolitik als Beitrag zur Lösung von Krisen und Konflikten', 28 April 2014.
 25. Auswärtiges Amt, 'Review 2014: Aussenpolitik weiter denken', 25 February 2015.
 26. Bundesregierung, *Weissbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik und Zukunft der Bundeswehr*, 13 July 2016.
 27. The concept of 'networked security' comes from the 2006 White Paper. See also: Schlie, 'Warum Deutschland künftig mehr denn je auf einen gesamtstrategischen Ansatz in der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik angewiesen ist'; Schlie, 'Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik'; Klaus Naumann, 'Die Gewährleistung kohärenter Außenpolitik – Wie "vernetzt" man "Sicherheit"?', *Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik* 8 (2015); Andreas Wittkowsky, Wanda Hummel and Tobias Pietz, "'Vernetzte Sicherheit": Intentionen, Kontroversen und eine Agenda für die Praxis', *Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik* 5 (2012).
 28. Deutscher Bundestag, Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung, 'Neufassung der Geschäftsordnung des Bundessicherheitsrates', 18. Wahlperiode, 18-5773, 13 August 2015.
 29. See also: Kai Zähle, 'Der Bundessicherheitsrat', *Der Staat* 44, no. 3 (2005); Volker Busse, 'Organisation der Bundesregierung und Organisationsentscheidungen der Bundeskanzler in ihrer historischen Entwicklung und im Spannungsfeld zwischen Exekutive und Legislative', *Der Staat* 45, no. 2 (2006); Gerold Lehnguth and Klaus Vogelgesang, 'Die Organisationserlasse der Bundeskanzler seit Bestehen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Lichte der politischen Entwicklungen', *Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts* 113, no. 4 (1988): 536ff.
 30. Deutscher Bundestag, Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Alexander Graf-Lambsdorff, Grigorios Aggelidis, Renata Alt, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion der FDP – Drucksache 15990 – 'Schaffung eines Nationalen Sicherheitsrates', 19. Wahlperiode, 19-16508, 15 January 2020, 2.
 31. Julianne Smith, 'Eine Frage der Staatskunst. Deutschland sollte erneut über einen Nationalen Sicherheitsrat nachdenken', *Internationale Politik* January/February (2019).
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 34. Wolfgang Krieger, *Die deutschen Geheimdienste* (München: C. H. Beck, 2021), 115.
 35. These reflections are based on a memorandum written by Hans-Georg Wieck in 1990 (private papers Ulrich Schlie).
 36. BVerfGE 115, 118 Rn. 113.
 37. BVerfGE 150, 1 Rn. 197.
 38. On US experiences see: Robert Hutchings and Gregory F. Treverton, eds, *Truth to Power. A History of the U.S. National Intelligence Council* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). On British experiences, see: Michael S. Goodman, *The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee. Volume I: From the Approach of the Second World War to the Suez Crisis* (London: Routledge, 2015).
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 41. Oliver Gnad, ‘Wie strategiefähig ist deutsche Politik? Vorausschauende Regierungsführung als Grundlage zukunftsrobuster Entscheidungen’, in *Internationale Sicherheit im 21. Jahrhundert. Deutschlands internationale Verantwortung*, ed. James Bindenagel, Matthias Herdegen and Karl Kaiser (Bonn: Bonn University Press, 2016).
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- Entwicklungspolitik stärken’, Drucksache 19/8058, 27 February 2019.
44. Unofficial translation of §1 sec. 2, *Gesetz über den Bundesnachrichtendienst*. See also: Christian Bareinske, ‘Auslandsaufklärung’, in *Handbuch des Rechts der Nachrichtendienste*, ed. Jan-Henrik Dietrich and Sven-R. Eißler (Stuttgart: Boorberg, 2017); Christoph Gusy, ‘Gesetz über den Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND-Gesetz – BNDG)’, in *Sicherheitsrecht des Bundes*, ed. Wolf-Rüdiger Schenke, Kurt Graulich and Josef Ruthig (München: C. H. Beck, 2014).
 45. See: Harold P. Ford, *Estimative Intelligence: The Purposes and Problems of National Intelligence Estimates* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993); Thomas Fingar, *Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011).
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 47. Michael Howard, ‘The Strategic Approach to International Relations’, repr. in *The Causes of Wars and other Essays* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), 36.
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 49. Foreword by Thomas S. Schelling, in Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor. Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962), vii.
 50. For a dated but good example of how an integrated strategic analysis process may look like based on all-source, top-level strategic intelligence estimates which will be separately considered from the viewpoint of what they imply for defence and foreign policy see: ‘Report on Implications for U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy of Recent Intelligence Estimates’, dated 23 August 1962, presented to President John F. Kennedy by a ‘Special Inter-Departmental Committee’. Its members were the US Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this instance, the basis for this integrated strategic analysis

was National Intelligence Estimate 11-8-62, 'Soviet Capabilities for Long Range Attack', dated 6 July 1962. The analysis of implications was conducted by three working groups: one concerning implications for defence policy was chaired by the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Paul H. Nitze), a second working group concerning implications for foreign policy was chaired by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Charles Bohlen) and a third group concerning intelligence on Soviet strategy was chaired by the Assistant Director for National Estimates, CIA (Sherman Kent). See: Raymond L. Garthoff, *Intelligence Assessment and Policymaking: A Decision Point in the Kennedy Administration* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1984).